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Abstract 
Human emotions constitute a complex interaction of biological and cultural 
cues. These are interpreted by an individual’s mind and body, and may or may 
not manifest through behavior. The paper briefly reviews the study of emotion, 
or affect, as it has evolved through the history of the West. The focus is on an 
interdisciplinary overlapping of humanities, arts, sciences, and philosophy. With 
advances in scientific fields such as neuroscience, complemented by stronger 
scholarship in social, psychological, and cultural studies, the most recent affective 
turn might be the stepping off point for the emergence of a sustainable affective 
science. The paper touches on a selection of theories and arguments headed in that 
direction. 
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Emotion History 
Since at least antiquity, in both Eastern and Western civilizations, human emotions 
have been a topic of discussion, influencing ideas in art, science, philosophy, human 
development, and socio-cultural planning. With the rise of European early modernity, 
the topic morphed its way alongside developments in humanism, empiricist philosophy, 
public literacy, and public theater (Frevert, 2014). Specifically, the 17th century adopted 
a synonym for emotion, in the term affect (Oatley, 2004), partly to differentiate affective 
manifestation and experience from the base emotions themselves. In the process, eminent 
thinkers, such as Descartes ( 1649/2015) and Spinoza ( 1677 /2006), began theorizing for a 
modern approach to emotion/afect. These ideas remained fundamental to emotion study 
well into the 20th century, aiding its development while simultaneously fueling a number of 
scientific and philosophical biases that impeded its progress. 
The current paper wil use the terms emotion and afect interchangeably, except when noted. 
Present-day endeavors represent a historically unique period in the development of emotion 
studies, largely from what is termed the affective turn (see section below). Emerging mostly 
from the 1990s, the effort was partly ignited by criticism against behavioral, reductionist, 
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and mentalist theories, which included the long-debated mind-body dualism made famous 
by Descartes (Damasio, 1994). Much of the criticism itself emerged with regard to advances 
in areas such as neuroscience, genetics, social dynamics, and information processing, al of 
which provided new tools in the very recent formation of an affective science (see Barrett & 
Gross, 2013). At the same time, it must be remembered that many of the questions driving 
the contemporary trek also occupied the ancients and moderns alike. Similar to then, today’s 
motivations for addressing the human complex of emotion/affect manifest from concerns 
over crime, war, power, belief, economy, human control, and human enrichment. 
Affect Theory 
As would be expected with any topic of long lineage, there are also ages-old difficulties 
on how to address them. In the first line of their edited book, The Affect Theoヴ Reader,
Seigworth and Gregg (2010) asked，“How to begin when, after al, there is no pure or 
somehow originary state for affect？”（p. 1). A somewhat abstract yet analogous and telling 
answer resides in the title of the collection’s first chapter，“An Inventory of Shimmers.”The 
American Heritage Dictionary (2016) defined a shimmer as a flickering or tremulous light; a 
glimmer. It is something that one can never possess yet is undeniably there. It also suggests 
a topic that is both curious and perplexing. 
The term emotion itself is defined by EncyclopediαBritαnnicαas“a complex experience of 
consciousness, bodily sensations, and behavior that reflects the personal significance of a 
thing, an event, or a state of a征airs”（Emotion,2015). This definition is in no way fixed, as 
emotion remains a heterogeneous catego門・ Rather than being concrete objects, emotions 
are constructs used for addressing the phenomena that they purport to represent (Griffiths, 
2008). In fact, about the only common thread, among several leading theorists of emotion, 
is that emotions are in no way absolute, but rather are relational in some way to an 
individual’s environment, interests, desires, values, and goals (Robinson, 2005). 
As mentioned, the term affect was first employed in an effort to distinguish between what 
emotions were and how they manifested in experience. Specifically, in the most influential 
early-modern Western text on the subject, The Pαssions of the Soul (1649/2015), Descartes 
made two key arguments: (i) the mind should be understood separately from the body; and 
(i) the emotions or passions are perceptions that belong to the body. Consequently, in order 
to free the mind for optimal functioning, an individual must overcome the poisoning efect 
of such bodily passions, which in turn requires one’s cultivation of virtue and control over 
habit. The divisions and prescriptions based on this view, in principle and practice, were 
pursued into 19th and 20th century schools of mind and behavior. In particular, the school 
of radical behaviorism shifted the focus entirely away from emotions as something internal, 
stressing only their affective externalizations and how to control them. This became the 
reigning dogma in the United States, and conveniently served the purpose of behavioral 
modification, in everything from personal therapy to education and human management 
(Mills, 1998). The model was eventually superseded by the cognitive trek, a more formalist 
return to ancient and early modern ideas, regarding emotions as primarily perceptions and 
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cognitive judgments. 
In general, emotions are addressed in nearly every major cultural framework, philosophy, 
and ideology throughout world history. To varying degrees, each of these also imposes 
certain boundaries, regarding which a百ectivebehaviors are beneficial and allowable, and 
which must be managed or even suppressed (cf., Tuske, 2011 for emotions in classical 
Indian thought; Gade, 2008 for emotions in Islam; Weyher, 2012 for emotions as addressed 
by Karl Marx). 
In the history of Western analytical traditions, a core division, in how to address emotion, 
dates back to at least Plato and Aristotle. On the one hand, Plato concluded that emotions 
were merely animal behaviors that could not be trusted (Knuuttila, 2004), placing him firmly 
in the camp of prescriptive suppression. Although Plato’s writings were lost to Europe 
throughout much of its Middle Ages, his views on affect were reintroduced to the modern 
era as the enlightened position. The rational essence of such views has remained central to 
a number of agendas up to the present, including that of 20th centu町 radicalbehaviorism, 
and is arguably at the core of modern medical and biological models for psychopathology 
and mental illness (see Horwitz, 2013; Maddux & Winstead, 2012). Aristotle, by 
comparison, intended to understand the emotions for the roles that they played. In what 
could be considered a kind of applied emotionality, the philosopher constructed a number 
of these ideas in Poetics (Douglas, 2014), a work stil cited for the term cαtharsis, Aristotle’s 
classic treatment of affective purging through artistic expression. Though the split between 
Platonic prescription and Aristotelian application is not a true dichotomy, since both Plato 
and Aristotle relied on cognitive models for thought and behavior (Robinson, 2005), it has 
nonetheless played into the dichotomizing of Western affective thinking to the present. 
Consequently, with a historical mixture of curiosity and contempt for the emotions 
in science and analytical thought, the subject has largely fallen into the hands of what 
eventually became known as the humanities. The trouble here concerns consistency, 
with definitions for emotions ranging from sublime and ineffable to being nothing more 
than pure feelings. As Robinson (2005) rightly pointed out, an individual can experience 
emotions that are neither sublime nor ineffable, such as anger, and can certainly experience 
a feeling that carries no emotion, such as basic hunger. Emotions can also manifest without 
an accompanying behavior, such as secret love. Put succinctly, emotion is not behavior. 
Behavior is behavior. Emotions are not feelings. Feelings are feelings. 
As the current essay has touched on, historical research on emotions and emotional 
evolution (e.g., Frevert, 2014; Oatley, 2004) has added considerably to the topic’s 
understanding. It also contributes to the argument that emotions themselves are 
too complex to submit to reductionist explanations common in both positivist and 
deconstructionist thought. Even in the analyses of areas rich with emotional exploration, 
such as literature, poetry, music, film, painting, and other areas that might qualify under 
the termαrt, an urge remains to discuss and define emotional and aesthetic content in 
terms of reasoned and reductive constructions. Armstrong (1998, 2000) forcefully argued 
that excessive analytic and anti aesthetic discourses, common throughout the latter half 
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of the 20th century, not only missed the points concerning art and emotion, but they were 
invariably anti-feminine and destructive. Overall, both the historical and pro-aesthetic 
arguments raise two important points. First, engaging and expressing emotion through 
a medium like art is separate from experiencing and discussing emotion in art. Second, 
discussing emotion requires new, dynamic ways of interpreting emotion, which must escape 
the biases and limitations of ordinarγlanguage. 
Affective Turn 
With the particular depths of emotion left much in the hands of the humanist, it is the 
humanist who has traditionally made considerable effort to record and interpret the depths 
of affective phenomena. Frevert (2014) reiterated this point in a comprehensive historical 
study, one incorporating the latest archival research on high periods of artistic emotion in 
the West. 
“… Emotions are by no means a new or original topic of either popular or scholarly 
reflection. Philosophers, literary specialists, and art historians have in recent years 
shown how theories of the emotions left their mark on ancient rhetoric, on the theatre 
of early modernity, and on modern literature. …Today’s experimental, cognitive and 
neurosciences lack depth by comparison”（p. 2). 
At the same time, as Keen noted in Empαthy and the Novel (2007), the resurrection of 
emotional discourse, at least in critical conversations on literature and narrative, have come 
from cognitive and neuroscientific literary studies (e.g., Armstrong, 2013; Bernaerts, De 
Geest, Herman, & Vervaeck, 2013). Accordingly, as steadily implied in the current paper, 
the humanistic and scientific approaches may not be as competing and divisive as commonly 
depicted, but rather complementary and merely incomplete. 
Eastern thought has seen similar trends regarding mind and emotion. For instance, in 
classical Indian philosophy and Buddhist thought, a fundamental idea resides in an emotion-
cognition binding, which is influenced by the socio-cultural environment (Tuske, 2011 ).
In world literatures, too, including those from India and China, Hogan (2003) discovered 
universally recurring emotional themes at the core of the narratives. In this and subsequent 
work, Hogan’s (2011) conclusion was that narrative genres themselves, beyond their form 
as literary constructions, are organized at the depth of linguistically affective themes. The 
implication, backed by considerable research, is that narrative and emotion are together a 
fundamental characteristic of human psychology (see Laszlo, 2008; Mar, 2004; Oatley, 2011; 
Sanford & Emmott, 2012). 
Whether the recent a仔ectiveturn truly represents a new e百ortor is merely the renaming 
of an ancient topic, it nevertheless represents an influential shift. Defined as the turn 
to emotion studies, and even to an affective science, hints of a turn began with the 
development of psychology itself, as voiced by two of its most-eminent early commentators, 
William James (1892/2012) and Sigmund Freud (1926/2013). The focus was particularly 
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taken up by the existentialists, including the eminent therapist Rollo May (1975/1994), who 
wrote extensively on the relationship between meaning, emotion, and creativity. In what 
became known as scientific psychology, Wilhelm Wundt described affect as a fundamental 
characteristic of the human mind (Barrett & Gross, 2013). 
Though the position took time to root, emotion study has since become a central 
feature with regard to phenomena labeled mental or psychological. In the 1990s, with 
breakthroughs in neuroscience and data handling, the study of affect attracted several 
important pioneers who would help define the debate with their respective work, names 
that included Antonio Damasio (1994), Joseph LeDoux (1998), and Jaak Panksepp (1998). 
Eventually, in the year 2012, a formal, international move toward a仔ectivescience began, 
with the formation of the Society for Affective Science (see SAS, 2016). 
Affective Purpose 
After generations of the emotions being treated in numerous ways, including as litle more 
than curious phenomena, why was there the specific shift to an interdisciplinary academic 
discourse? In addition to the ancient and modern concerns mentioned thus far, the moral 
philosopher and legal scholar, Martha Nussbaum, framed the current motivation in two 
contemporary arguments. The first was Upheαvαb of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions 
(2001 ),which essentially refuted the Platonic and Cartesian stances that emotions were 
destructive to correct thinking. Citing the growing literature from affect studies, Nussbaum 
stressed that emotions tend to positively inform and drive intelligent behavior, whereas 
thinking left alone can devolve into detachment from humanity, environment, and even 
reality. In other words, emotions ground thought. Additionally, despite popular belief, itis 
not necessarily the emotions themselves, but thoughts of the ungrounded, poorly grounded, 
or otherwise disa釘ectedtype, which are more capable of manifesting into social injustices, 
sociopathic behaviors, and al manner of atrocities. 
In the second of her c出icalassessments, entitled Not戸rProfit: Why DemocraりNee出 the
Humαnities (2010), Nussbaum stressed that the bedrock of a healthy and peaceful civilization 
lies not with wealth, which is inherently divisive, but with the types of ethical, empathic, 
and communicative lessons that the humanities ofer. Support for Nussbaum comes from 
the study and implementation of creativity (e.g., Cohen, 2011; Reiter-Palmon, 2011; Taylor, 
2011), in which humans are recognized as not merely reasoning analysts, but as adaptive, 
imaginative, and creative problem resolvers motivated by emotional and environmental 
interests. An older yet related argument resonates from Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy 
( 1872/ l 995). In this work of dramatic theory, Nietzsche borrowed from classical Athenian 
tragedy, to argue that art transcended the pessimism and nihilism of a fundamentaly 
meaningless existence. In the modern world’s heightened sense of human suffering and 
other cruelties, Nietzsche suggested that a new and acute form of insight had emerged, in 
the form of“tragic perception, which, in order even to be endured, requires art as protection 
and remedy" (p. 55). 
From the study of creative endeavors throughout historγ，it is clear that artists, musicians, 
Emotion Studies: Directions inHistory, Science and Humanities 47 
and writers have instinctively understood such insight, in which conveying emotion 
has served as a kind of metric for creative and communicative success. In modern 
developmental terms, Habermas and Diel (2010) showed how insight-knowledge transfers 
well through the narrative format, one also e仔ectiveat eliciting emotions. Likewise, Kidd 
and Castano (2013) presented evidence that reading literary fiction can improve empathy 
and Theory of Mind in children, a point that Lodge (2002) also made about adults. Like 
Nietzsche before them, several contemporary scholars (e.g., Keen, 2007; Pizarro, Detweiler-
Bedel, & Bloom, 2006) indicated that reading in general can alter, and even craft, an 
individual’s moral and cultural outlook, sometimes dramaticaly. 
Despite the evidence pointing to art as a valuable tool for affective development, the 
contemporary industrial, institutional world continues to segregate arts from sciences, and 
emotion from knowledge. Consequently, in debates about the value of emotion and the 
arts, it remains dificult to build a much-needed art-science bridge that considers emotion. 
More recently, this is beginning to change within a variety of fields, including in something 
as seemingly abstract as artificial inteligence (e.g., Scheutz, 2014), which must address the 
growing need for machines to interact more naturalistically with humans. More generaly, 
in a biological and anthropological perspective, Rottger-Rossler and Markowitsch (2009) 
concluded that emotions should be understood “as highly complex bio-cultural interaction 
systems”（para. 3), ones that ultimately develop over time. Complex interactivity iscertainly 
nothing new, neither to the artist nor the scientist. Hallmarks of both artistic and scientific 
achievement are replete with such individual qualities as openηes (Feist, 1998), which also 
serve the development of creativity, knowledge, and moral imagination (Narvaez & Mrkva, 
2014). 
Regarding Nietzsche ( 1872/ 1995) again, on art as protection and remedy, the integration 
of emotion and art should be apparent, an integration that is ultimately inseparable from 
a larger complex of emotion, culture, art, science, inteligence, and consciousness. A 
number of contributions have addressed this from interdisciplinary platforms, including 
Robinson (2005), who reiterated the primacy of emotions in literature and the arts. The 
same can be said about narrative specifically, particularly from Hogan’s work on human 
narrative universals (2003) and narrative a釘ect(2011 ). Relatedly, Kovecses (2002) produced 
influential work on the relationship between metaphor and human emotion. 
Emotion Study 
Beyond the question of why it is important to study human emotions, there isperhaps 
the more challenging question of how to study them. In their introduction to affect theory, 
Seigworth and Gregg (2010) identified no les than eight major streams of overlapping 
emotion investigation, including those from philosophy, phenomenology, anthropology, 
psychology, and neuroscience. Along the path, of what they referred to as“infinitely 
multiple iterations of a百ectand theories of affect”（p. 4), the authors stressed what Massumi 
(2002) had already emphasized previously, that the topic would seem less fractured and 
overwhelming if inquiry began “with movement rather than stasis, with process always 
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underway rather than position taken" (Seigworth & Gregg, 2010, p. 4). 
Accordingly, in a perspective also applicable to the topic of intelligence, several scholars 
(e.g., Griffiths, 2008) have articulated that emotions themselves should not be treated, or 
reified, as tangible objects. When compared to the neurophysiological processes, as when 
neurons fire or serotonin releases, emotive behavior must also be understood as linguistic 
constructs used to articulate the physical and mental phenomena being experienced. This 
is not intended to reduce emotions to mere interpretations of language. On the contrary, 
in the growing wake of scientific psychology, the point is to stress that human a百ectis a 
complex system, one that does more than merely manifest emotive behavior from biological 
mechanisms (see R6ttger-R6ssler & Markowitsch, 2009). 
At the same time, it is paramount to consider the biological aspects of emotion. Humans 
are biological organisms, and emotions are intimately bound to the human body. Two of the 
most popular and comprehensive neuroscientific expressions of this perspective come from 
LeDoux (1998, 2002) and Damasio (1994, 2010). Both addressed emotion, consciousness, 
and the feeling of self, as interdependently emergent and embodied phenomena. In this 
regard, it might be helpful to think of human emotions as operating on two key levels: the 
basic or primary-process emotions (i.e., instinctual and animal), and the higher-order or 
cortical emotions (i.e., large brained mammalian and human). 
In the exhaustive work Archαeology of Mind, Panksepp and Biven (2012) submitted a 
succinct neuroevolutionary account of the core emotional systems at work in humans and 
their mammalian relatives (see Johnson, 2010; Rumbaugh & Washburn, 2003, regarding 
mental and emotional life in nonhuman mammals). In decades worth of laboratory studies, 
Panksepp ( 1998) identified seven primary mammalian emotions, including fear, grief, and 
joy/playfulness. The researcher also discovered that mammals could become addicted to 
the same substances as humans, such as cocaine, and affectively respond to those addictions 
in similar ways. At this fundamental level, Panksepp’s research clearly suggested that 
a百ectiveconsciousness, or the basic capacity to feel or experience feeling, isαnoetic (i.e., 
bound to the momentary present) and thus independent of language. Phrased differently, 
the primary-process emotions are unreflective brain states, which are consciously felt 
without the individual organism necessarily understanding what those feelings represent. 
Consequently, because the basic emotions take shape in the shared, primary-process brain 
regions across species, the belief that humans are unique from other species, merely due 
to the ability to feel or emote, is simply inaccurate. The di百erencebetween humans and 
other mammals with large cortices, such as primates (Boly et al., 2013) and cetaceans (Berta, 
Sumich, & Kovacs, 2015; Herman, 2012), concerns the more recently developed decision 
making cerebral cortex, which constructs sense out of the primary emotional physiology 
(Panksepp & Biven, 2012). This top-levelαutonoetic process (i.e., ability to reflect beyond 
the momenta町 present)depends on numerous variables in the healthy individual, including 
memories, modes of learning, beliefs, motivations, and language. 
As mentioned, the process also takes its cues from culture, and from the plasticity of the 
brain to adapt to such culture and environments. This idea is not new, as it relates to the 
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early dialectical-cultural psychology of Lev Vygotsky (Robbins, 2003). However, the likes of 
Vygotsky took several decades to reach the West, particularly the United States, a country 
where the normalization, pathologization, and medicalization of behavior was set atop an 
analogy of the individual as a hardwired organism. In such a limited, physical view of 
humanity, culture was relegated to so口alstudies and the humanities. Even here, the social 
sciences partly emerged as an instrument of the Cold War (Solovey & Cravens, 2012), and 
culture became somewhat of a dataset to be studied for institution and nation building. 
Post-Cold War scholarship represents both a continuation of this trend and a new direction. 
It was this period when the a釘ectiveturn got its start, when more attention was given to the 
social aspects of emotion, through such mediums as social neuroscience (Rule, Freeman, 
& Ambady, 2013) and cross-cultural studies (e.g., Chentsova-Dutton, Ryder, & Tsai, 2014; 
Kitayama & Markus, 1994). 
Affect Interpretation 
Within emotion studies themselves there is something of a distinction-relation paradox, 
between emotion perceiving and emotion experiencing. The notion is at least as old as 
William James ( 1892/2012), who observed that neither visual information nor intellectual 
ability alone were sufficient to produce or interpret an emotion. As Ekman (2007) noted, 
when people see a face, how they interpret the expression on that face is an approximation, 
hence the perception of the emotion behind that face is also an approximation. 
To illustrate, imagine the photograph of someone’s contorted face. What exactly is that 
person feeling or expressing? Is it anguish or triumph? What gender is the person, and 
what about ethnicity? Where is the person, and what is he or she wearing? Is there any 
relevant background information, such as action or the presence of other people? The 
point here concerns multiple cues, in that not al instances of an emotion, perceived or 
experienced, appear alike. The structural information from the image, from the facial 
expression itself, and from other parts of the visual source, might not be sufficient for an 
accurate emotion perception (Barrett, Mesquita, & Gendron, 2011 ).
Likewise, the actual emotion experience of the individual does not always involve the 
same neurophysiological characteristics. As with the multiple inputs needed to perceive 
the emotion, multiple inputs also guide the state of the person having the emotion. For the 
complete emotional experience of a given moment, physiological changes will interact with 
the individual’s perception and evaluation skils, to generate the individual’s state in that 
moment. More simply, an emotion is a kind of self-informing event: a person’s situation 
influences his or her emotional state, which in turn influences the person’s situation, and 
so on. James (1892/2012) expressed this partly through the example of seeing a bear and 
sensing fear. ln James’s day, the common belief about fear was that encountering a bear 
would cause fear, which in turn would generate the reaction to run. However, James 
believed that seeing the bear triggered an instinctual response to run, which in turn was 
interpreted by the individual as experiencing fear. 
In current studies of affect, the consensus is that both of these views have merit, with 
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the understanding that fear is not a simple cause-and-effect mechanism (LeDoux, 1998). 
Humans possess primal instinctive fears, as well as learned behavioral fears, which end 
up informing one another and depend on the relative situation (see Rottger-Rossler & 
Markowitsch, 2009). In the case of the bear, what kind of bear is it, what is the person’s 
experience or knowledge of bears, and what are the circumstances of the encounter? 
The point leads to the role of language on the manifestation of an emotional state, 
including the state of fear (see Klemfuss, Prinzmetal, & Ivry, 2012; Niemeier & Dirven, 
1997, for discussion and review). In this linguistic sense, emotion perception is categorical, 
as when grouping emotional events, objects, or experiences into terms such as hαppy or 
sad. At the same time, these very same labels also serve as conceptual knowledge, which, 
in turn, informs a person’s ability to make the categorical groupings in the first place. In 
this way, such language groupings function to shape or constrain the range of emotions in a 
given experience, including the experience of encountering a bear. The same applies to the 
case of the photograph, when encoding emotion visually and linguistically from an image 
(Barrett et al., 2007; Gendron et al., 2012). 
As one final example, of affect interpretation and response based on a complex of multiple 
inputs, consider the way a sight-impaired person reacts to situations and to the emotions 
of other people. Specifically, blind people in Western cultures typicaly smile when their 
picture istaken. In the case of someone with complete lifelong blindness, neither a 
photograph nor a smile is something that the individual has ever visually witnessed. Yet, 
through cues of language, the behavior of others, and the feeling associated with a genuine 
smile, the same person can imagine and intuitively understand what a photograph is and 
how to respond in the presence of a camera. In psychological terms, the conscious or 
unconscious decision to smile must be informed by the multiple cues, including feelings, 
before the reaction occurs. 
The smiling phenomenon draws attention to a broader discussion, on the differences 
between what is biologicaly natural and what is culturally normative. Everγhuman being 
with a healthy neurological system experiences joy and has the ability to smile. At the 
same time, diferent cultures will encode individual members of the culture with cognitive 
and affective controls regarding when smiling is behaviorally appropriate. For example, 
Americans are typically expected to smile or somehow outwardly emote throughout the 
course of the day, even in professional situations, lest they be considered unfriendly or even 
socially inept. ln comparison, Japanese are typically discouraged from smiling or outwardly 
emoting in formal settings, lest they be considered rude or socialy inept. 
Conclusion 
The current paper presented an overview on some of the ways human affect has been 
approached historicaly, and how it is being considered and understood today. Emotion 
as a topic of inquiry is at least as old as antiquity, and its exploration runs through the 
sciences and humanities. Some fundamental historical debates, along with continuing 
disagreements over definition and approach, stil drive much of the inquiry, and the cros-
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cultural research and implications have only just begun. In the meantime, findings in 
neuroscience, conclusions from comparative animal studies, and a richer investigation of 
environmental sources such as culture, are helping to generate a more accurately complex 
and comprehensive picture of what emotions are and how they both hinder and benefit 
human development. 
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